Map upstream and downstream physical, digital, human, and supply dependencies
7 min read
Lesson objectives
- Map upstream and downstream physical, digital, human, and supply dependencies for a documented critical-service case.
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From an inventory to a causal map An asset register says what an organization owns. A dependency map asks which resources must remain available, and in what sequence, for a service to reach its threshold. Represent each node as a particular function or resource whose condition can be checked. Draw an arrow from a supporting resource to the function that relies on it, and label the connection with its dependency type and time to impact. If pumping relies on power, control, and an on-duty operator, three arrows enter the pumping function. A spare pump does not remove a power outage that disables both pumps. Distinguish an internal dependency, such as a shared valve within one station, from an external one, such as a distribution utility or fuel route. Distinguish an immediate effect from a delayed one buffered by a tank or battery. CISA's infrastructure resilience planning framework discusses dependencies and cascading disruption between systems; it provides the planning orientation here, not the fictional case data.
Start at the service outcome established in the prior lesson, step back to the functions needed to produce it, and then identify each function's resources. Do not draw every imaginable connection. Support each arrow with an operating reason, test, or document, and label an unsupported connection as an assumption. Give each arrow four fields: owner, evidence for the connection, depletion or impact time, and a verified alternative. Time changes response priority. A battery that preserves control for two hours is different from a generator whose fuel needs replenishment after four. If the alternate path uses the same valve or power substation, do not call it independent. Independence means that the relevant scenario does not contain a credible shared cause that can disable both paths, not merely that the asset register has two names.
Classify dependencies as physical, digital, human, and supply related. Electricity, water, and fuel flows are physical; pressure signals and remote control are digital; line isolation may need a qualified person with authority and availability; generator operation may depend on a fuel contract and an accessible road. One node may span categories: an external communications provider carries a digital signal and relies on power and physical sites. Define the analysis boundary to keep the map usable. This lesson examines a healthcare facility's water service during the first six hours of a local disruption; it does not claim to map hazards across an entire region.
Mark whether converging arrows represent “and” or “or.” The service might function with P1 or P2, but both routes still require filter T. The pump relationship offers alternatives; the filter is a shared necessary condition. A diagram of unlabeled arrows could imply that any path reaching the service node is sufficient. If the minimum threshold is 12 cubic metres per hour and P2 alone can deliver only 8, P2 is a partial substitute, not a sufficient service path, even though it can pump some water. Put capacity and the prior lesson's threshold beside the route. If a shared resource can be bypassed manually, document bypass time, authority, and the result of a recent test. An untested assertion that bypass is possible does not remove the common failure point from a six-hour decision. Obtain the external provider's actual service conditions rather than attributing an unagreed recovery commitment to it.
Check each arrow by asking what happens if its source node disappears. Loss of feeder F1 prevents P1 in this model; loss of P1 does not cause F1 to vanish. Another system might have a reverse relation, but do not add it because it is theoretically possible. Note feedback loops that complicate recovery: a power outage can prevent refueling at an external station, and lack of fuel can prolong the local generator interruption. The graph can suggest a focused test: does the fuel supplier have independently powered dispensing? Without evidence, record an uncertainty and keep the six-hour conclusion conditional. The diagram exposes a question; it does not calculate a joint failure probability from absent data.
Lesson summary
From an inventory to a causal map An asset register says what an organization owns