Size opportunity and stage investment
11 min read
Lesson objectives
- Turn market size into a constrained entry scenario with reach, conversion, capacity and contribution.
Please sign in to use all the tools
Once you sign in, the reading tools are yours: larger or smaller text, typeface, line spacing, focus mode, highlighting and bold, and notes saved to your account and gathered in My study.
From market size to contracts this team can actually deliver
“The market is worth a billion” sounds reassuring but does not answer what this team could sell over the next twelve months. Separate three questions that should not be compressed into one figure: what is theoretical demand if everyone could be served, what portion can the product, geography and route to market serve, and what portion can this team win and deliver within its time and capacity? These layers are often called TAM, SAM and SOM. We use the labels as organizing language, not an accounting rule or guarantee about customers. Always specify the unit: accounts, users, contracts or annual purchase value. Say whether the price includes service. Ten thousand employees at target firms do not imply ten thousand contracts when the company buys centrally.
Build from the bottom: an account list within the boundaries established in lesson one, intersect the eligibility conditions, then estimate deals through contact capacity, sales cycle and onboarding capacity. A top-down industry estimate can check plausibility, but an assumed share of it is not a sales forecast. Data sources differ in confidence: named account records that can be deduplicated; public statistics covering a wider category; selected interviews exposing the nature of a problem; and sales-team assumptions. Do not treat them alike. If the organization count is known but the share using a supported system is unknown, present scenarios for that share rather than multiplying an unmeasured average by the whole market. State what might change each assumption: a new integration, competitor, understaffing or delayed procurement.
An expanded offer might eventually enlarge the serviceable market, but do not count an unfunded future product in the current entry case. Nor should annual renewals be added year after year as if they were new customers. A revenue forecast needs motion: opening accounts, new opportunities, stage conversion, close timing and starting capacity. Keep potential contracted value separate from cash collected and accounting revenue recognized; each has different timing and rules. Module four examines the distinction. For now, do not call pipeline value “revenue.” An unsigned opportunity cannot fund fixed spending as if cash had arrived.
What changes in the decision, not merely in the spreadsheet?
A scenario is not three numbers filling cells labeled “pessimistic, central, optimistic.” Give each case an observable cause, an effect on funnel transitions or capacity, and a different action. Closing may fall because the buyer lacks budget authority. More salesperson training alone is then unlikely to fix the gap; a smaller offer or a different decision owner might. Demand may be strong while onboarding stalls. More advertising would enlarge the queue, whereas integration or service investment might be appropriate. Draw a tree with at least two questions: is qualified purchase intent visible, and can the team deliver it at an acceptable contribution? If the first answer is no, revisit market and message. If the first is yes and the second no, repair offer economics or operations before scaling. Do not bury all outcomes under “sales below forecast.”
Suppose the nine-contract plan requires 120 contacts, forty conversations, eighteen proposals and nine signatures. Assumed transitions are 40/120 ≈ 33.3%, 18/40 = 45%, and 9/18 = 50%. None is a universal benchmark. The chain identifies where the plan breaks. If forty conversations yield only five proposals, the discovery-to-proposal step is weak: perhaps a technical requirement or message mismatch, rather than insufficient contact volume. If eighteen proposals yield only two signatures, examine price, objections and approval cycle. If average closing time shifts from one month to four, nine eventual contracts may not become cash in the observed six months. The investment decision therefore needs a cash window, not only an annual contract count. Waiting may be justified for good opportunities, but its cost and a spending ceiling should be explicit.
The better forecast keeps “known” and “assumed” in one register. For instance, 420 eligible accounts come from a dated intersection of account records; 9/120 is an operating assumption to revise; 3,000 service cost is an estimate from ten onboardings; and 12,000 price is an offer decision, not proof of acceptance. Record the owner of each input, its update date and what changes when it moves. Do not give the 420 count and close-rate assumption equal certainty. As new results arrive, update the affected assumption instead of rewriting the historical plan to look prescient. Learning remains useful even when entry fails.
Check double-counting across routes as well. If a partner can reach sixty of the 120 accounts on the direct team’s list, combining the lists does not create 180 unique accounts. Record account ID, first contact route, date and relationship owner; then choose direct or partner selling under a clear agreement. If both teams quote different prices to one account, realized price may fall and the partner relationship may deteriorate—costs concealed by a market-size total. Define opportunity ownership, a protection period and discount authority before launching the channel. The reachable list expands only after finding new, unique, serviceable accounts, not after sending more messages to the same ones.
The final executive decision is conditional: “Fund a forty-account phase because first-year contribution is 7,000 under the stated price and cost assumptions. Continue if three qualified proposals and one signed contract appear in a defined period without breaching the onboarding cap. Re-estimate if service cost rises above 5,000 or realized price falls to 10,000.” Another management team could choose other gates, but it must retain a numerical rationale and inspection date. Then market figures inform a decision that changes with evidence, instead of becoming a large number that cannot be challenged.
Lesson summary
Reach, conversion and capacity bound the executable opportunity; sensitivity shows when viability reverses.