From lesson 1, readable now without an account: Define a purchasable segment, not merely a category
A segment must be buyable, not merely presentable
Suppose a software company says it serves “small businesses.” That category is too broad for an entry decision. It may include a shop owner who buys alone and a service firm that needs four approvals, with different budgets, sales routes, integration demands and service costs. A useful entry segment is a group of accounts that can be identified before selling, shares a consequential problem, can be reached through a feasible route, and can buy a repeatable offer. We call this a “purchasable segment” in this lesson. It does not imply every account will buy. It means the team can estimate the eligible account set, contact it, and test a specific purchase hypothesis at an affordable cost. This is our operational decision definition, not an official industry classification.
Fix the decision unit before estimating size. For an enterprise service, do not mix the number of firms with employees or end users. If a parent company buys for its branches, is one parent contract or each branch the account? That choice changes the apparent market and the conversion denominator. Define the period and the geography you can actually serve. A global market figure is not helpful to a team that can sell in two regions. The US Small Business Administration’s market research guidance asks about demand, market size, location, saturation and pricing, and distinguishes existing data from direct customer research. Yet a general source does not establish demand for this particular offer. That remains a hypothesis to test with potential buyers.
Start with exclusions before ranking. Write eligibility rules observable before investing a salesperson’s time: the operation the product serves, a minimum usage level if integration economics require it, a reachable contact route, an identifiable problem owner, and service and support capability. Do not use “has budget” as a gate if you have no honest way to observe it in advance; make it a later qualification question. Separate a hard gate from a ranking signal. Inability to support a customer’s system language may block a sale today. A slow approval cycle may reduce attractiveness without making the account inherently ineligible. If the product team could close the language gap in two months, record when that segment should be reconsidered rather than burying the constraint in an average score.
After eligibility, compare segments on common criteria. Problem intensity is not company size: ask what happens if the problem persists, who owns its resolution, and how often it recurs. Reachability asks whether the team can name accounts and find a permitted, testable contact channel. Profit potential looks at expected contribution after service cost, not headline revenue alone. Delivery fit checks setup burden, support demand and whether a solution can be repeated. Record evidence and uncertainty beside each rating. Five interviews from a founder’s network are not representative market evidence, though they can reveal the words buyers use. Three genuine requests for proposal more strongly support purchase intent in a narrow group, but they still do not prove that hundreds of similar accounts are reachable.
Do not treat unlike ratings as precise scientific measurements. A transparent decision matrix can expose sensitivity: state weights, apply the same rating definitions to each option, and test whether a reasonable change to weights changes the order. If a small change flips the result, gather more evidence about the decisive criterion or run a smaller trial. Balance expected value against speed of learning. A large segment with slow procurement may be less useful for a first entry than a smaller segment that gives evidence of payment and use within weeks, when the first wave aims to test the message and delivery rather than maximize immediate revenue.